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SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS ARE NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
Robert E. Ross & Barrett Anderson*
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution is silent on the method for electing
representatives, as it only requires the apportionment of seats in
the House following the decennial census. Congress and the states
determine many of the electoral rules affecting the House, such as
the method of apportioning seats, the manner of electing
representatives, and the size of the House. As such, Congress, the
courts, and state legislatures have become central actors in
determining apportionment law that dictates the institutional
design and representative nature of the House. After ratification
of the Constitution, states experimented with different methods
for electing representatives based on representational
preferences and needs. It was Congress that ultimately required
that states uniformly use single-member districts, creating
institutional rules that profoundly affected the composition of the
House of Representatives. Article 1, Section 4 stipulates that
“Congress may at any time by law make or alter [election]
regulations.” Does this language include the ability to require
states to adopt a uniform method for electing representatives?
Can the single-member district requirement be constitutionally
justified through an understanding of congressional power to
make electoral regulations? These questions are the result of the
broad language in the Elections Clause. Given the lack of judicial
interpretation on this matter, understanding the constitutional
development of single-member districts requires a focus on the
constructed meaning of the Constitution that emerged within the
political debates over preferred electoral rules.

*

Utah State University.
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Gill v. Whitford is a recent case of the Supreme Court
entering the “political thicket” of redistricting. The case centers
on Wisconsin’s redistricting plan, following the 2010 census,
passed by a Republican-controlled legislature in 2011. A district
court declared the plan violated the Constitution because it
favored one party, while disadvantaging the other—an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. Voting results in the
Wisconsin elections help substantiate this claim because, in 2012
and 2014, Democrats received more votes (just over a majority)
than Republicans, yet the Democrats only won 39 of the 99 seats
in the state-assembly. Wisconsin Republicans maintained that
they did not intentionally create partisan districts, but the
disparity emerged because of a natural geographic advantage they
have in rural areas, where their voters are evenly distributed,
compared to the Democrats, who are clustered in urban areas.1 In
this case, drawing geographical district lines mattered for the
partisan composition and representativeness of the state
legislature.
While Gill v. Whitford focused on state-level redistricting, in
2015, the Court ruled on a case dealing with congressional
redistricting and the use of independent redistricting commissions
to reduce partisan gerrymandering at the federal level. In Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission, the Supreme Court considered if a popular initiative
could empower an independent commission to draw district lines
for the state. State legislatures are constitutionally empowered to
determine “the manner of holding elections” for the House,
including drawing district lines. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg argued that the “Legislature” in the Elections
Clause could also refer to any body capable of making laws,
including “the people.”2 According to this understanding, the
concept of legislature was expanded, allowing for additional
avenues to drawing district lines other than state legislatures, the
common practice based on the interpretation of the Elections
Clause. Like many previous cases, the Court’s ruling constructs an
1. Gill v. Whitford, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/whitford-v-gill.
2. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652 (2015). See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore & John Yoo, People ≠ Legislature, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 341, 342 (2016) (commenting on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona State
Legislature and arguing that “the Court read the word ‘Legislature’ out of the Elections
Clause.”).
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understanding of Article I, Section 4 and the scope of
congressional power under the Times, Places and Manner Clause,
specifically related to creating constituencies and determining the
nature of congressional representation.
These cases are but two examples of the Court’s engagement
with the concept of representation and how it is determined
through institutional design. Currently, the House of
Representatives utilizes a system of single-member districts as the
required method for electing members to the House. That is,
every state is apportioned representatives based on population,
and each state is divided into a corresponding number of
geographically based voting districts, with one representative
elected from each district. The decision to require single-member
districts raises important questions regarding how and where
these geographic voting boundaries are drawn. As seen in Gill v.
Whitford, this matters for who votes, for whom they get to vote,
and the electoral connection between voter and representative.
When the Court is called upon to adjudicate cases involving
redistricting, it primarily addresses the process and outcomes of
drawing (or redrawing) district lines. However, the deeper
institutional question of the origin and constitutionality of singlemember districts is never addressed.
Scholarship on the development of single-member districts in
the United States has rightly focused on the 1842 Apportionment
Act, which was the first time Congress required states adopt a
particular method for electing representatives. This Act was
important in the development of Article I, Section 4 because the
Whig Party’s interpretation of the Times, Manner, and Places
Clause shifted power from the states to Congress in determining
the manner of electing representatives. Accordingly, research has
provided explanations for why the Whigs pursued this particular
electoral reform, including arguments from partisanship or self-
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interest3 and concern for representation.4 These accounts are
useful for understanding an important moment in the institutional
development of the House of Representatives and the nature of
federalism. However, they do not capture subsequent
developments beyond the 1840s and how the 1842 understanding
of the Election Clause remained settled, even amidst legal
challenges that emerged during the “apportionment revolution”
of the 1960s.
This article will focus on two separate but interrelated
developments: 1) the origin of using single-member districts as a
method of representation and 2) how the meaning of the Election
Clause was settled to legitimize congressional authority to require
states to use single-member districts. The Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Election Clause, while important for
understanding contemporary voting rights, does not address the
broader, historical meaning of the Clause. In other words, relying
on the Supreme Court for understanding the Elections Clause
provides relatively little guidance for understanding the origin
and constitutionality of the congressional single-member district
mandate.5 In this article, we provide a brief historical account of
the origin of using single-member districts as a method of political
representation, a discussion of the development of the Election
Clause and how Congress interpreted it to justify their
requirement that states use single-member districts, and an
account of how the Supreme Court has yet to address the
constitutionality of congressional power over the method of
electing representatives. Answering the questions of the origin
and constitutionality of the single-member district requirement
has important bearing on the concept of representation, as single3. See CHARLES A. KROMKOWSKI, RECREATING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:
RULES OF APPORTIONMENT, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT, 1770-1870 (2002); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE:
REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1850 (1987); Martin H. Quitt,
Congressional (Partisan) Constitutionalism: The Apportionment Act Debates of 1842 and
1844, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 627 (2008); Michele Rosa-Clot, The Apportionment Act of
1842: ‘An Odious Use of Authority’, 31 PARLIAMENTS, ESTATES & REPRESENTATION 33
(2011); Johanna Nicol Shields, Whigs Reform the ‘Bear Garden’: Representation and the
Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 355 (1985); Bernard Ivan Tamas, A
Divided Political Elite: Why Congress Banned Multimember Districts in 1842, 28 NEW
POLI. SCI. 23 (2006).
4. Robert E. Ross, Recreating the House: The 1842 Apportionment Act and the Whig
Party’s Reconstruction of Representation, 49 POLITY 408 (2017).
5. Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders under the Elections Clause, 114
YALE L. J. 1021 (2005).

ROSS & ANDERSON_DRAFT 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

7/21/18 1:47 PM

SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS

265

member districts often fail to provide representation to political
and ethnic minority groups.6 It also has implications for
understanding the political process by which constitutional
meaning is constructed absent judicial interpretations.7
I. ORIGIN OF SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS
After independence from Britain was declared, states began
developing their own constitutions, and, following English Whig
political thought (and John Locke), many of them limited the
prerogatives of the governor and ensured the legislatures reigned
supreme because it embodied the people. American legislatures
were to be the government, and the people were empowered
through legislative bodies and their representatives. The nature
and scope of representation was perhaps the most important
political controversy leading up to the revolutionary war and
after. The concept of representation emerged from the
impossibility of convening the whole people to make legislative
decisions, particularly in areas that were both demographically
and geographically dispersed. The challenge became designing a
constitutional system that translated the voice of the people to the
legislative body through representation, one that could not be
based on English institutional design.
A system of representation could not be derived from
experience with English representation. If anything, the
American system of representation needed to learn from the
failures of the English model. The British system of
representation was designed to accommodate limited geographic
and social mobility and a constituency that was relatively small
and static. Geographically based representation, then, was
utilized to represent geographically distinct communities.8 During
6. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/REAL VOICES: THE CASE OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1993) (arguing
that proportional representation where multiple legislators are elected from a district is a
fairer, more representative approach to democratic elections); LANI GUINIER, THE
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY (1991) (arguing for proportional voting as a means for increasing the
representation of historically underrepresented communities).
7. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (exploring the history of
constitutionalism and how non-judicial bodies have understood and applied the principles
of the constitution).
8. ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF A CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 69 (2005).
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the seventeenth century, as the population increased and
mobilized, England’s existing system of representation derived
from community-based district lines no longer sufficed. Although
England used a form of electoral districts, the problem of rotten
boroughs and a small number of those choosing representatives
created systematic inequalities in representation. The English
House of Commons, the branch of Parliament intended to
represent the people, had become so unequal, irregular, and
inadequate in its representation that by the middle of the
eighteenth century, it hardly reflected the voice of the people and
was separated from the interests of those it was supposed to
represent.9 The House of Commons represented interests, not
people, and if interests were not adequately represented, the
English system of representation failed. The rallying cry
preceding the American Revolution of “no taxation without
representation” was an indictment of English constitutionalism
and the importance of connecting legislative powers to a system
of representation. If representation was to be constructed using
electoral districts, they would have to be created using more
systematic and equal criteria.
Creating institutions of representation took place on two
levels, national and state. At the national level, the Articles of
Confederation created a system of representation that was more
political than geographical.10 Under the Articles, state legislatures
elected representatives instead of having communities or districts
elect them. Representation was not proportionally allocated
because each state was allowed to send no less than two and no
more than seven representatives. On legislative matters, each
state was given one vote and nine of thirteen votes were required
to pass legislation. This fundamentally established representation
of states as political bodies over representing people, a form of
representation that continued in the Senate under the new
Constitution. The lack of representing people or local
communities would have to be addressed in the institutional
design of the House.
At the state level, five states, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New
York, Vermont, and South Carolina, utilized electoral districts for
representative purposes. For example, the 1776 New Jersey
9. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787
165 (1998).
10. REHFELD, supra note 8, at 78.
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Constitution stipulated that counties choose representatives to
the Assembly. The 1777 New York Constitution established
representation for the various counties based on population, with
a census taken every seven years and alterations to the number of
representatives made based on population changes. This is to say,
these state constitutions contained specific language requiring
periodic adjustments to representation based on changes in
population to maintain a system of proportionate and equal
representation.11 The decision to use single-member districts with
the number of representatives adjusted based on a decennial
census was not something early Americans borrowed from
English political thought and practice. As Jay K. Dow argued, “in
the colonial era there was nothing that looked like the singlemember district system for the representation of individuals.”12
The manner of understanding and constructing a system of
representation in the House was not inherited from the British,
but the result of American political and constitutional
development based on the ambiguous language of Article I,
Section 4.
Single-member districts were not universally utilized by all
states before or after ratification of the Constitution. While the
idea and practice of using electoral districts occurred in many
states prior to ratification, single-member districts coupled with
the plurality rule was not formally adopted until decades later. At
the national level, the idea of single-member districts emerged as
a product of debates over representation, particularly in the
House of Representatives. The manner of election determines the
type of representative and manner of representation. During
founding debates, both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were
aware of how electoral rules would determine representation and
the objectives of government. The Federalists’ vision of
representative government recommended representative be
elected using a plurality rule through large, heterogeneous, singlemember districts. The Anti-Federalists preferred electing
representatives through majority rule in smaller, more
homogenous, single-member districts.13 Both the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists agreed that single-member districts were the
11. WOOD, supra note 9, at 172.
12. JAY K. DOW, ELECTING THE HOUSE: THE ADOPTION AND PERFORMANCE OF
THE US SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICT SYSTEM 13 (2017).
13. Id. at 25.
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preferred electoral configuration. However, they differed greatly
on the details of district creation and election rules. The
Constitution does little to resolve this debate because it does not
provide specifics related to the manner of electing
representatives.
II. SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The requirement that states utilize a uniform method for
selecting representatives first came from the 1842 Apportionment
Act. In the process of reapportioning representatives in the
House, a Whig-controlled Congress also stipulated that
representatives be elected by single-member districts. Prior to
this, states widely experimented with different methods of
electing members to the House. The two most prominent methods
were single-member districts, or a general ticket election wherein
voters voted for an entire slate of representatives with as many
names as there were seats. Some states, like New York and
Pennsylvania, used multi-member districts in urban areas to
provide additional representatives for the higher population. At
the time of the 1842 apportionment, congressional power to
require states use single-member districts was a major
constitutional question, one that was the subject of extensive
debate in Congress and elicited the first presidential signing
statement of consequence when President Tyler questioned the
constitutionality of the single-member district requirement.14 It is
within these debates that political actors established the
constitutionality of single-member districts through a more
expansive construction of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause
in Article I, Section 4.
Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution contains the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause, which reads:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.

This Clause stipulates that state legislatures are the primary
agents for regulating congressional elections within their state.
14.

Id. at 111.
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Congress, following their power to make or alter regulations, has
intervened on certain occasions, but there is no clear
constitutional text establishing the scope of congressional power
within this political arena. Is congressional power to require
single-member districts constitutionally justified by such phrases
as “Times,” “Places,” or “Manner”? This question, and the
meaning of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause, were central
to the debates over the 1842 Apportionment Act and the
congressional mandate that states utilize single-member districts.
Beginning with the initial understanding of the Election
Clause is necessary to fully understand the extent to which the
Whig Party constructed new constitutional meaning to justify the
congressional mandate for single-member districts.15 At the
constitutional convention and during the ratification process, the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause was understood to be a
necessary, albeit limited means of ensuring the states did not
disrupt or subvert the national government by failing to hold
congressional elections. Critics of the Constitution feared the
Clause was too ambiguous, and this ambiguity allowed Congress
to assume power at the expense of the state governments. Two
interrelated constitutional issues emerged during debates over the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause: ensuring adequate
representation and balancing power within a federal system. This
section discusses the constitutional development of the Election
Clause by explaining when and how Congress assumed power
over federal elections and prohibited any election method other
than single-member districts, as well as the Supreme Court’s
position on Article I, Section 4 and electoral questions.
A. Constitutional Convention and Ratification
Delegates at the constitutional convention did not discuss the
Election Clause at great lengths because it was introduced
towards the conclusion of the convention. Initially, the language
addressing legislative power was relatively broad, and very few
specific details emerged. For example, the “Virginia Plan”
empowered the legislative branch “to enjoy the Legislative Rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate
in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
15.

Ross, supra note 4, at 416–417.
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the exercise of individual Legislation.”16 Charles Pinkney and
John Rutledge opposed this proposal because the word
“incompetent” was extremely vague and could potentially vest
Congress with indefinite powers.17 Despite opposition, the
proposition was quickly adopted two days later. This broad
language, however, did not survive the Committee of Detail that
was formed towards the conclusion of the Convention.
On 6 August, once the delegates reconvened after an
adjournment, the Committee of Detail replaced the broad grant
of congressional powers with a list of enumerated powers. Among
the powers was the Times, Places, and Manner Clause that
initially read: “The times and places and manner of holding
elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the
Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them
may, at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United
States.”18 In the subsequent days, the delegates immediately
began considering the Committee’s provisions and wasted no time
debating each enumerated power now granted to the legislative
branch, including the Times, Places, and Manner Clause.
On 9 August, the preliminary Times, Places, and Manner
Clause was addressed, and discussion proceeded by separating it
into its two parts: 1) the power granted to state legislatures to
“prescribe” the times, places, and manner of holding elections and
2) the power granted to the national government to alter the
election provisions made by the states. Debate over the Clause
centered on the nature of federalism under the new Constitution.
Charles Pinkney and John Rutledge defended the states’ power
and role in the election process by proposing to eliminate the
entire second part of the Clause. They believed the states “could
& must be relied on in such cases.” Conversely, Nathaniel
Gorham defended the national legislature’s ability to alter state
election law, comparing the proposed power with that of the
British Parliament. Building on Gorham’s position, Madison
challenged Pinckney and Rutledge’s supposition by expressing his
own reservations about relying on the states for election purposes.
The “necessity of a Gen Gov,” he argued, “supposes that the State
Legislatures will sometimes fail to refuse to consult the common
16. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
31 (1987).
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id. at 387.
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interest at the expence [sic] of their local conveniency [sic] or
prejudices.”19 To substantiate his position, Madison connected the
mode of selecting members of Congress with the nature of
representation and its relation to policy preferences in the House.
If a state legislature had a particular policy preference, it could
manipulate electoral rules to favor particular candidates, and any
inequalities in representation at the state level would be
transferred to the national legislature. Without a safeguard on
state power, state legislatures could influence representation in
the House by manipulating the times, places, and manner of
holding elections. In other words, the House would become more
representative of the state legislatures rather than representative
of the people.
After addressing the danger of giving plenary power to the
states over elections, Madison explained how the institutional
design of the proposed Congress would make power over
elections safe at the national level. There would be no danger in
giving Congress power to alter state election laws because of the
members of Congress. Under the proposed system, senators were
elected by state legislature and members of the House elected by
the same people who elected members of the state legislatures. If
those who advocated for state authority, like Pinkney and
Rutledge, had confidence in the state legislatures to not abuse the
power of regulating elections, then they must also have
confidence that those same people would elect individuals to the
Senate who would likewise not abuse the power granted to the
national legislature. Therefore, reasoned Madison, congressional
power over the times, places, and manner of elections to Congress
was both necessary and safe.
Following Madison’s defense of the Clause, Rufus King and
Gouverneur Morris made final arguments for the propriety of
granting the national legislature power over elections by raising
further concerns about states abusing their power. In particular,
they both expressed concern that the states would disrupt the
election process by making “false returns and then make no
provisions for new elections.” In this way, their concern was
slightly different from Madison’s. Madison feared that, without
the intervention of Congress, states could manipulate the election
for their own policy purposes; King and Morris feared that states
19.

Id. at 423.
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could disrupt the election process to subvert the national
government’s power and eliminate the entire House of
Representatives by not electing members to it. In light of these
arguments, the motion to eliminate congressional power over
elections did not prevail, as even those who had “sufficient
confidence in the State Legislatures” believed “it might be best to
retain the clause.”20 The delegates only made minor adjustments
to the Clause’s language after deciding to maintain the two
sections. The new Clause was understood to remedy both
Madison’s and King and Morris’s concerns in that the national
government was capable of altering state election provisions only
in the case of electoral manipulations or refusal to hold elections.
With these minor alterations, the new Clause passed
unanimously. From this accepted language, states were initially
understood to have more control over federal elections, and there
was no constitutional language or identifiable preference for the
use of single-member districts.
On 14 September, towards the end of the convention, The
Times, Places, and Manner Clause was changed one more time
before the final version was accepted. As the delegates voted on
the final version of the proposed constitution, the phrase, “except
as to the places of choosing Senators” was unanimously added to
“exempt the seats of Govt in the States from the power of
Congress.”21 Otherwise, Congress could determine where state
legislatures could meet and where states could locate their
capitals. During the Virginia ratifying convention, Madison
further explained the necessity of this addition:
[I]f Congress could fix the place of choosing the senators, it
might compel the state legislatures to elect them in a different
place from that of their usual sessions, which would produce
some inconvenience, and was not necessary for the object of
regulating elections. But it was necessary to give the general
government a controul over the time and manner of choosing
the senators, to prevent its own dissolution.22

The exemption of “place” for senatorial elections coincided
with the federal intention of the Clause. The House of
Representatives was designed to “derive its powers from the
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 635.
Debate in the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 311 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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people of America;” the Senate would “derive its powers from the
States, as political and coequal societies.”23 Again, the Times,
Places, and Manner Clause, ensured House elections did not
become creatures of the state legislatures, disrupting the
“national” character of the House. The additional phrase also
ensured the Senate would be elected by state legislatures, which
maintained the “federal” character of the Senate.
While there was little debate throughout the convention,
during the ratification process, The Times, Places, and Manner
Clause, was a source of contention. The Anti-Federalists and the
Federalists both addressed the ambiguities of Article I, Section 4,
with the Anti-Federalists providing a more comprehensive
critique of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause than what was
given at the convention. For the Anti-Federalists, the Clause
exemplified aspects of the Constitution that could be broadly
interpreted to subvert state sovereignty and eliminate federalism
from the proposed system. Federal Farmer constructed a critique
of the Clause that mirrored Madison’s defense of it at the
convention. Madison had argued for the necessity of the Clause
based on his fear the state legislatures would manipulate electoral
laws to their advantage in selecting members to the House. The
Anti-Federalist author, however, inverted the argument: “The
branches of the legislature are essential parts of the fundamental
compact, and ought to be so fixed by the people, that the
legislature cannot alter itself by modifying the election of its own
members.”24 And, because of Article I, Section 4’s vagueness, “the
general legislature may . . . evidently so regulate elections as to
secure the choice of any particular description of men.”25 Given
the broad language in the Clause, the general Anti-Federalist
charge centered on the danger to their understanding of
representation in that the national government could manipulate
election laws so as to prohibit the people, particularly the “people
who live scattered in the inland towns,” from electing
representatives. There was a fear that Congress could
constitutionally establish electoral laws that only allowed “a few
men in a city” to be represented. That is, the Anti-Federalists
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 243–44 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000).
24. Federal Farmer, No. 3 (1787), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 249
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralpher Lerner eds., 1987).
25. Id.
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feared Congress would make the House more aristocratic rather
than democratic.
This concern over representation and the Times, Places, and
Manner Clause was repeated by Brutus. Fearing that Congress
would “alter itself by modifying the election of its own members
at will and pleasure,” he argued that the Clause was dangerous to
equality and representation in that “[w]hen a people once resign
the privilege of a fair election, they clearly have none left worth
contenting for.” The result of these unfair elections would lead to
a “weakness of the representation” because the ambiguous power
granted in the Clause would allow Congress to “make the whole
state one district, and direct, that the capital (the city of NewYork, for instance) shall be the place for holding the election; the
consequence would be, that none but men of the most elevated
rank in society would attend, and they would as certainly choose
men of their own class . . . .” Representation in the House would
not be representative of the people but “one tenth of part of the
people who actually vote.”26 The Anti-Federalists believed the
Constitution should limit the new national government, and the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause dangerously empowered the
government at the expense of equality and fair representation.
For the Anti-Federalists, Article I, Section 4 was a key to
institutionalizing fair congressional representation, as they were
acutely aware that electoral laws would determine the nature of
representation in the House of Representatives. They proposed
that the Constitution require states use a district system to ensure
equal and fair representation. As Federal Farmer described:
To secure a representation from all parts of the community, in
making the constitution, we ought to provide for dividing each
state into a proper number of districts, and for confining the
electors in each district to the choice of some men, who shall
have a permanent interest and residence in it; and also for this
essential object, that the representative elected shall have a
majority of the votes of those electors who shall attend and give
their votes.27

Brutus likewise argued for the district system: “Provision
should have been made for marking out the states into districts,
and for choosing, by a majority of votes, a person out of each of

26.
27.

Id.
Federal Farmer, supra note 24.
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them of permanent property and residence in the district which
he was to represent.”28 On 12 January 1788, Federal Farmer again
challenged the “ambiguous and very defective” article and
proposed the Constitution provide for representation based on
small, single-member districts with representatives chosen by a
majority rather than plurality of voters. Otherwise, “we have no
security against deceptions, influence and corruption.”29 The only
way to secure fair representation was to “fix elections on a proper
footing, and to render tolerably equal and secure the federal
representation, but by increasing the representation, so as to have
one representative for each district, in which the electors may
conveniently meet in one place, and at one time, and chuse by a
majority.”30 For the Anti-Federalists, the proposed Constitution
did not provide adequate or explicit means of securing fair
representation of the people in the House of Representatives.
The Anti-Federalists’ appealed less to state sovereignty and
more to explicit constitutional constructions for a solution to the
problem of electoral rules and representation in the House. In
particular, Federal Farmer advocated for a stricter delineation in
power between the national and state government. Keeping with
the federal spirit of Article I, Section 4, he argued Congress
should be given the enumerated power to establish electoral
districts within a state and to “regulate, from time to time, the
extent of the districts so as to keep the representatives
proportionate to the number of inhabitants in the several parts of
the country.”31 Moreover, because not all regulations related to
elections can be enumerated, those incapable of being fixed by the
Constitution should be left to the states, reserving powers to them.
Finally, Congress should be given expressed powers to regulate
the elections laws reserved to the states only when the state
neglects to make them. In this way, the federal spheres of
constitutional powers would be further defined and clarified,
minimizing the prospect of abuse by both the national
government and state governments.

28. Brutus, No. 4, (1787), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 251 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralpher Lerner eds., 1987).
29. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE 105 (Michael
Zuckert & David Webb eds., 2009).
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id. at 111.
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In response to the Anti-Federalists’ publications, Hamilton
discussed and defended the Times, Places, and Manner Clause in
three separate articles written for The Federalist.32 In general, he
believed no other article in the Constitution was “more
completely defensible” than this one because it provided
Congress with “the means of its own preservation” and “every just
reasoner will at first sight, approve an adherence to this rule, in
the work of the Convention; and will disapprove every deviation
from it.”33 Similar to discussion in the constitutional convention,
Hamilton argued the power to regulate elections was essential,
and the real question to be discussed was where to position this
power. He defended placing power over elections with the
national government rather than giving it solely to the states. The
propensity to abuse such power was much greater if given to the
states than the national government because “it is more rational
to hazard [abuses of power] where the power would naturally be
placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed.”34 More to the
point, if the power over elections was a necessary means of selfpreservation for the national government, propriety dictated that
the national government be entrusted with the power for its own
preservation rather than granting it to the care of the states.
Like the Anti-Federalists, Hamilton focused on the House of
Representatives as the primary target for attempts to abuse the
power over elections. Because of institutional design, the Senate
was insulated from abuse due to the rotation of elections as the
entire senate was never up for election. As a result, “a temporary
combination of a few states, to intermit the appointment of
Senators, could neither annul the existence nor impair the activity
of the body.” The House of Representatives, however, was
susceptible because if the “State Legislatures were to be invested
with an exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period
of making them would be a delicate crisis in the national
situation.”35 There was more at stake than just the danger of states
disrupting the House by electing representative. Without the
Clause, the national character of the House of Representatives
was also in question because the “scheme of separate
32.
33.
2000).
34.
35.

See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 59, 60, 61 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
Id. at 380.
Id. at 381.
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confederacies, which will always multiply the chances of ambition,
will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in the
State administrations as are capable of preferring their own
emolument and advancement to the public weal.”36 The Clause
was necessary to ensure the House of Representatives maintained
its national character and represent, as Madison described in
Federalist No. 39, the individual citizens in their individual
capacities.37 The Clause was an important protection of federalism
within the newly proposed system because it would protect the
national character of the House and provide for national
representation in Congress to balance the state based equal
representation in the Senate.
Similar arguments were made in ratification debates
throughout the states. In general, if any alterations to Article I,
Section 4 were suggested, they primarily sought to make
Congress’s power over elections more limited and explicit by
adding language that would only allow Congress to exercise their
power when states failed to hold elections.38 After ratification
debates, no official alterations were made to the Clause, and the
dominant understanding was settled on the presumption that
Congress would only exercise its limited power over elections in
instances of self-preservation.
This understanding that emerged from ratification debates
changed during the 1800s, as political actors attempted to create
a uniform system for electing representatives through
constitutional amendment. These efforts were often tied to the
Electoral College and the method of allocating votes. Under the
proposed amendments, members of the House would be elected
using the district method, representatives and Electoral College
electors would be selected from the same district, with the
remaining two electors selected using the same method as electing
senators. John Nicholas, a Democratic-Republican from Virginia,
introduced the first of these proposals in 1800. His resolution went
36. Id. at 382.
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000).
38. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010). Meier points out that, in the Virginia ratifying
convention, Madison “had defended the provision as it stood and suggested that it already
gave Congress the power that Massachusetts and New Hampshire wanted to make explicit.
Apparently, he saw no need to change Article I, Section 4, even to remedy the discontent
it had caused in many state conventions” Id. at 448–49.
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to a committee, which rejected and returned the proposal and it
never went to chamber for debate. The committee’s
recommendation for rejection assumed the resolution
superfluous because Congress already had the power to regulate
congressional elections. As early as 1800, understanding of the
Elections Clause had changed, and it was assumed Congress had
power to determine the method of electing representatives.39
Throughout the 1810s and 1820s, multiple attempts at amending
the Constitution to require districts and prohibit general ticket
elections passed the Senate but died in the House.40 The lack of
congressional amendment meant that the meaning of the Election
Clause was still unsettled, and any understanding of congressional
power that required states to adopt a particular electoral system
never translated to a legislative outcome.41
The meaning of the Times, Places, and Manner Clause was
not seriously contested again until 1842. With the adoption of the
Constitution, the Clause was understood to provide Congress
with regulatory power over elections in the event of states failing
to hold them. However, this initial constitutional understanding
was challenged and a new constitutional construction was
developed that expanded the role of Congress in determining
state election law. For the first time, Congress interpreted its
power in Article 1, Section 4 as a grant of power requiring states
to use single-member districts in elections for the House of
Representatives.
B. CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND THE 1842
APPORTIONMENT ACT
After the 1840 Census, the Select Committee on the
Apportionment of Representatives set a ratio of one
representative for every 68,000, which reduced the total number
of representatives in the House. While this reduction was
unprecedented, a later amendment was added that required states
to adopt single-member districts for House elections. Like the
reduction in representatives, this was the first time Congress
proposed to require that states adopt a uniform system for
electing representatives to the House. The districting requirement
became Section 2 of the Apportionment Act, producing debate
39.
40.
41.

DOW, supra note 12, at 113.
Id. at 113–16.
See, e.g., ZAGARRI, supra note 3.
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over the meaning of the Times, Manner, and Places Clause and
the constitutionality of Section 2.42
Quickly after Section 2 was introduced, representatives
questioned the constitutionality of requiring that states utilize a
particular method for electing representatives. Rep. Joseph R.
Underwood (W-Ky) believed Section 2 “proposed to Congress to
do that which it had no constitutional power to do, viz: direct the
State Legislatures how to act in the matter of State elections to
Congress.”43 William L. Goggin (W-Va), in addressing the
constitutionality of Section 2, read extensively from Madison’s
notes at the Constitutional Convention and relied on the
interpretation that Article 1, Section 4 was “intended only to be
used in the last resort, in case the States should neglect or refuse
to act, in order that the wheels of the General Government might
not stop.”44 Rep. Walter T. Colquitt (D-Ga) denounced the
constitutionality of Section 2 by emphasizing how the districting
requirement conflicted with other aspects of the Constitution.
Section 2 did not relate to “time” and “places” in Article I, Section
4, only “manner.” However, Section 2 unconstitutionally added
qualifications to members of the House because it requires
representatives to live in the districts from which they are to be
elected. “Manner” cannot be construed to mean this. The
qualifications for members of the House was already established
in Article I, and Section 2 unconstitutionally adds to these
qualifications. Section 2 also unconstitutionally abridged voting
rights because the Constitution states that representatives are to
be chosen by the people of the state, and each voter is allowed to
vote for every representative within a state. If the districting plan
were adopted, representatives represented only a fraction of the
state, and suffrage rights were limited to only voting for one
representative rather than the full slate allotted to the state.45
“Certainly it must be a far-fetched construction,” Rep. Colquitt
argued, “to say that the manner of holding an election, gives
power to say who shall be the voters at the election, where they
shall live, and how many they may legally support!”46 Opponents
of Section 2 relied on a limited reading of Article I, Section 4 that
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 124.
Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 445 (1842).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447.
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lodged power over elections primarily with the states rather than
Congress.
Rep. William L. Goggin (W-Va), although opposed to
Section 2, provided arguments for the constitutionality of
congressional power to district. During his reading of Madison’s
notes to oppose Section 2, he conceded that “in strictness,
Congress did possess the power to district the states,” but
exercising this power was an “odious use of authority.”47 Thomas
Arnold (W-Tn) likewise interpreted Madison as an authoritative
source that established congressional control over the subject of
districting. Garrett Davis (W-Ky) granted Congress power to
district states based on the language of Article 1, Section 4. The
ability to require districts surely is within the powers prescribed
to Congress by the words “make” and “alter.” If the states, under
Article I, Section 4, may decide to utilize either the general ticket
system or the district system, Congress is well within its power to
“totally and wholly” make and alter state regulations. Sampson
Butler (D-SC) addressed arguments that congressional power
over the “manner” of elections did not extend to requiring states
adopt a particular electoral method. Since the Constitution grants
congressional power over the time, place, and manner of
elections, “what plain, unsophisticated man, reading [Article I,
Section 4], would for a moment doubt the power of Congress to
control the whole subject, whenever, in its discretion, it shall see
fit to do so?”48 This meaning of the text is so unambiguous “so as
to silence all caviling.”49
The Whig majority in both the House and the Senate
narrowly passed the Apportionment Act with Section 2, then only
needing President Tyler’s signature. President Tyler, however,
questioned the constitutionality of the districting amendment and
attached a signing statement to the passed legislation. Despite
questioning its constitutionality, Tyler opted for a signing
statement rather than vetoing the bill because of an overarching
doubt that the “Chief Magistrate ought to outweigh the solemnly
pronounced opinion of the representatives of the people and of

47.
48.
49.

Id.
Cong. Globe, supra note 43, at 319.
Id.
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the states.”50 Regarding the districting amendment, Tyler
explained that the question of congressional power “to alter State
regulations respecting the manner of holding elections for
Representatives is clear, but its power to command the States to
make new regulations or alter their existing regulations is the
question upon which I have felt deep and strong doubts.”51 The
28th Congress faced controversy because of the districting
requirement, as four states, Georgia, Missouri, Mississippi, and
New Hampshire continued to elect representatives using the
general ticket system. However, by the 30th Congress, all states
with more than one representative utilized single-member
districts for elections.
Throughout debates on the 1842 Apportionment Act, both
sides utilized arguments from founding and ratification debates to
substantiate their claims regarding the constitutionality of Section
2. The general consensus during founding debates favored states
exercising power over elections with the national government
only intervening in the event states failed to hold elections.
However, this constructed understanding shifted towards Article
I, Section 4 being understood as granting Congress power over
elections, even at the expense of state authority over the matter.
This constitutional construction favoring congressional power
underlined the passage of the 1842 Apportionment Act, and it
established precedent for Congress taking a more active role in
the making and altering election law.
C. POST-1842 DEVELOPMENTS
After the 1842 Apportionment Act, Congress continued to
exercise its power over House elections. The 1850 Apportionment
Act did not include the districting requirement. However, this
exclusion was not because the power to require districts was in
question. The requirement was again added to the 1862, 1872,
1882, 1891, 1901, and 1911 Apportionment Acts, with Congress
including additional requirements to the districting process, such
as districts being composed of contiguous and compact territory
and the population of districts being as equal as possible.
Throughout the debates over these apportionment acts,
50. John Tyler, Special Message (Jun. 25, 1842), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds.), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=67545.
51. Id.
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congressional power to require districts was never challenged.
Rather than discussing the meaning of “times, places, and
manner,” Congress exercised their extensive powers over
elections by establishing further requirements for drawing singlemember districts. Following the 1842 Apportionment Act,
congressional power to require a specific electoral system was
seemingly settled because there were no serious objections to
districting mandate and subsequent prescriptions for drawing
districts.
During the 1920s, controversy over apportionment emerged
leading to the Supreme Court’s involvement with constitutional
questions related to reapportionment. No apportionment act was
passed following the 1920 census on account of two important
developments, population shifts from rural to urban areas and
World War I. For the first time in history, the census revealed that
more individuals lived in urban areas than rural. This caused great
concern over rural representation if the equal population
requirement had to be met, as rural districts would be
consolidated to allow for an increase in the number of urban
districts. The War also skewed census data because much of the
population was away from their home states in support of war
efforts, often concentrated in the larger, industrial cities of the
country.52 Congressional failure to pass apportionment legislation
meant the 1911 Apportionment Act remained in effect. In
anticipation for the 1930 census, Congress passed the
Reapportionment Act of 1929 that shifted apportionment power
from Congress to the executive and retained the districting
requirement without the regulations for how to draw districts.
That is, the Act was silent on drawing districts that were compact,
contiguous, and of equal population, meaning it did not
specifically repeal their use.53
The absence of any constitutional requirements or
congressional districting standards meant states varied in their
practice of drawing districts. Voters in Mississippi filed suit,
objecting to a gerrymandered and malapportioned district. In
Wood v. Broom, petitioners argued that Mississippi had not
conformed to the requirements that districts be of contiguous and
compact territory, as well as of equal population. However, these
52.
53.

DOW, supra note 12, at 160.
Id. at 175.
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requirements were based on the 1911 Apportionment Act, not the
1929 Act. The question before the Supreme Court was if the
requirements from previous apportionment acts were still in
effect, even if not specified in subsequent legislation. The Court
reasoned that apportionment requirements expired once a new
census was taken and only apply to the reapportionment “to
which they expressly related.”54 Importantly, Justice Holmes
reasoned that “[i]t was manifestly the intention of the Congress
not to reenact the provisions as to compactness, continuity, and
equality in population with respect to the districts to be created
pursuant to the reapportionment under the Act of 1929.” There
was no question regarding congressional authority in requiring
states adopt a particular electoral method. Congress had the
power to require states to utilize the districting method and
adhere to particular requirements for districts. If the 1929
Apportionment Act failed to specify requirements, “the omission
was deliberate;” if Congress had power to make requirements,
they also had power to omit them.55 Based on this decision, the
Court maintained congressional power over elections, reaffirming
the constitutional construction developed in 1842.
Wood v. Broom was only the beginning of the Court dealing
with electoral issues and the meaning of Article I, Section 4,
especially as it related to the Fourteenth Amendment. Colegrove
v. Green was similar to Wood, with voters challenging the
constitutionality of Illinois’ disproportionally populated districts.
The state legislature had not redistricted for 40 years, despite
large differences in populations that were shown in multiple
censuses. The petitioners challenged that these disproportionate
districts violated the equality of their votes. The Court, however,
rejected this argument and affirmed the state’s authority to not
redistrict and congressional powers over the political process of
reapportionment. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter
adopted the position of judicial restraint in the realm of electoral
issues:
The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State
legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample
powers of Congress. The Constitution has many commands
that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall

54.
55.

Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932).
Id.
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outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial
action.56

However, in his dissent, Justice Black argued that the
substantially unequal populations in each district reduced the
effectiveness of individual votes in the more populated districts,
which violated the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Without the equal population requirement, the average
population deviation between states dramatically increased, and
there was little incentive for members of Congress to reinstate the
requirement if it meant losing their seat due to malapportioned
districts.57 Malapportioned districts would not be addressed until
the judiciary created the redistricting revolution.
Baker v. Carr58 and Wesberry v. Sanders59 marked a shift for
the Supreme Court from Justice Frankfurter’s reliance on
Congress to deal with these political questions to Justice Black’s
argument that malapportionment violating the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Baker v. Carr, the argument focused on how a
lack of redistricting in Tennessee led to a “debasement of their
votes” for candidates in the state assembly under the Due Process
and Equal Protections Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.60
The Court’s rejection of the lower court’s decision, which
dismissed the case based on justiciability, provides insight into the
justices’ desire to establish jurisdiction in the realm of electoral
questions. To do so, the Court established a list of factors that
determine if a case constitutes a nonjusticiable political question.
However, considerations of state sovereignty and federalism,
prominent aspects of previous debates over the meaning of
Article I, Section 4, were absent from the list of factors. Building
on the decision in Baker, in Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court
extended the right to an equally weighted vote through equal
apportionment to federal congressional districts, forcing Georgia
to reapportion its House districts. Writing for the majority, Justice
Black argued Article 1, Section 2’s requirement that the “People
of the Several States” elect members to the House meant that
each individuals vote must carry the same weight relative to other

56.
57.

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
See ERIK J. ENGSTROM, PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150–58 (2013).
58. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
59. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)
60. Baker, supra note 58, at 188.

AND
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voters. Justice Harlan dissented, following Justice Frankfurter’s
Colegrove position that malapportionment was a political matter
better left to Congress. He also invoked Article I, Section 4 in that
Congress is given power to apportion representatives, while states
are empowered to determine the manner of drawing districts.
Importantly, although the Court asserted its jurisdiction over
electoral questions, these cases did not question congressional
authority to require single-member districts.
The Court went a step further in Reynolds v. Sims, when it
upheld a district court’s order to place a temporary redistricting
plan into effect when the Alabama legislature failed to provide a
plan that fit the court’s order. The Supreme Court declared that
all legislative districts had to be apportioned according to
population, striking down Alabama’s plan to give every county at
least one state representative and one state senator no matter the
population. Although the question in Reynolds concerned equal
representation under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
referenced single- and multi-member districts in a neutral manner
while building a hypothetical situation:
Single-member districts may be the rule in one state, while
another State might desire to achieve some flexibility by
creating multi-member or floterial districts. Whatever the
means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be
substantial equality of population among the various districts,
so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight
to that of any other citizen in the State.61

Reynolds merely required that legislatures make a
substantial effort to reapportion using equal population
districting. This hypothetical situation included state discretion
over the method of electing representatives.
Following 1911, apportionment acts did not include the
requirement for single-member district elections. This absence
allowed states to use alternative methods. In 1932, Missouri,
Kentucky, Virginia, Minnesota, and North Dakota elected
members to the House using at-large elections. From 1942-1946,
Arizona used at-large elections, as did New Mexico and Hawaii in
1942, and New Mexico, Hawaii, and Alabama elected at-large
representatives in 1962.62 With the Court determining
61.
62.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
CONG. Q., Guide to US Elections 1170–72 (1975).
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apportionment cases were judiciable, in 1967, as in 1842, Congress
once again exercised their power under Article I, Section 4 to
address the manner of electing representatives by passing
legislation that prohibited at-large and multi-member district
elections, thereby establishing single-member districts as the
preferred electoral method. Unlike 1842, there was very little
debate over the districting mandate and relatively no questions of
congressional power under the Constitution to do so. The only
major discussion involved the logistics of applying the
requirement to Hawaii and New Mexico, the only states not using
single-member districts. Senator Howard Baker (R-TN)
expressed hope that the districting mandate would “effectuate the
principles of one man, one vote,” and “the concept of singlemember districts . . . has been a nonpartisan undertaking by
Members on both sides of the aisle.”63 Returning to the
requirement first established in 1842, he further argued, provided
“maximum protection of the rights of all people and maximum
responsiveness to their needs.”64 The 1967 district requirement
can be understood as an extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
as there was concern that southern states would utilize at-large
elections to dilute minority voting.65 The development of the
Supreme Court’s malapportionment decisions and Congress’s
power over the manner of elections produced the prohibition of
alternative election methods other than single-member districts.
After the 1967 requirement for single-member districts, the
Court continued to strengthen the doctrine of equal population
apportionment without addressing the use of alternative election
methods. Responding to discriminatory voting requirements
against African Americans in the south, Allen v. State Board of
Elections extended the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
voting to include “all action necessary to make a vote effective.”66
Importantly, in his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the Court’s
reliance on the text of the Voting Rights Act provided no
guidance for determining the constitutionality of different
electoral methods, including single-member districts. During the
63. 133 CONG. REC. 34,037 (1967).
64. Id. at 34, 366.
65. See QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965–1990 (Chandler David & Bernard Grofman eds, 1994).
66. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563–70 (1969) (reviewing the
statutory language of the Voting Rights Act and applying it to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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1970s, the Court also extended the requirement of equal
population apportionment to overturn partisan gerrymandering
because it resulted in excessive population deviations between
districts.67 The justices further strengthened the equal
representation standard in Karcher v. Daggett by requiring that
redistricting consist of more than just equal apportionment of
populations. The Court struck down New Jersey’s congressional
redistricting plan that clearly favored Democrats. Although the
districts had almost equal populations, the Court stated that the
state bore the burden of proving that the districts had been drawn
in “good-faith”, which required that any differences in
populations between districts were shown by the state to be
necessary.68 During this line of cases, the justices did not explicitly
question the accepted practice of using single-member districts in
regards to providing adequate representation of various interests.
In 1986, the Supreme Court was presented with Thornburg v.
Gingles, which addressed racially motivated gerrymandering at
the state level in areas with multi-member districts. The North
Carolina General Assembly had apportioned its seats using both
single and multi-member districts strategically to fracture the
African-American vote. This apportionment scheme was
challenged under the Voting Rights Act and overturned. Relying
on the text of the Voting Rights Act, the Court argued it was
necessary to look at the “totality of circumstances” and found that
the use of multi-member districts had in effect denied African
Americans the ability to vote as a cohesive bloc.69 Despite the
opportunity to affirm or deny the constitutionality of both multior single-member districts, the Court relied on text of the Voting
Rights Act to declare that the use of multi-member districts was
aimed at discrimination against African-Americans and thus was
struck down. That is, the justices neither affirmed nor questioned
the state’s general use of both single- and multi-member districts
for elections to the state legislature. The constitutionality of multimember districts was only challenged when combined with
questions of equality of voting and racial gerrymandering. Absent
issues of racial vote dilution, the Court provided no indication as
to the constitutionality of alternative election methods.

67.
68.
69.

See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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The Court was later presented with an opportunity to affirm
the constitutionality of single- or multi-member districts in Holder
v. Hall, when voters defeated a petition to expand a county
commission to five members elected from single-member districts
and a chairman elected at large. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged that this
expansion was necessary because African-American votes were
diluted under the current structure, while a larger commission
would allow for the election of an African-American commission
member. The Court ruled against the NAACP, claiming that
racially motivated gerrymandering required strict scrutiny, which
the NAACP’s argument did not meet. In the process of this case,
the justices reaffirmed the Court’s neutrality on the
constitutionality of single- and multi-member districts when
Justice Clarence Thomas in his concurring opinion cited Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Allen v. State Board of Elections:
[T]he Voting Rights Act supplies no rule for a court to rely
upon in deciding, for example, whether a multimember at-large
system of election is to be preferred to a single-member district
system; that is, whether one provides a more “effective” vote
than another.70

Justice Thomas continued by citing a dissent by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, stating that the choice between
single- and multi-member districts is “inherently a political one.”
However, he also questioned preferences for using single-member
districting as an electoral method because the Constitution does
not explicitly recognize this practice:
It should be apparent, however, that there is no principle
inherent in our constitutional system, or even in the history of
the Nation’s electoral practices, that makes single-member
districts the “proper” mechanism for electing representatives
to governmental bodies or for giving “undiluted” effect to the
votes of a numerical minority.71

Further cases continued to focus on the constitutionality of
racial gerrymandering while not addressing the general use of a
particular voting method, with the Court overturning multiple

70.
71.

Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 896 (1994).
Id. at 897.
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attempts to create African-American majority districts while
relying on the use of minority packed single-member districts.72
Despite the multiple different electoral, redistricting, and
gerrymandering cases that the Supreme Court has heard, never
once have the justices declared the constitutionality singlemember districts and congressional power to require states to
adopt a particular method for electing representatives. Although
the Court asserted its jurisdiction over questions of racial and
political gerrymandering, it has thus far sidestepped the issues of
whether or not single-member districts are constitutional. This
may be because the Court has never seen a direct challenge to
their constitutionality, or it may be because the Court prefers to
maintain a neutral stance. Overall, the Supreme Court has never
addressed the question of alternative voting systems73 and left
unanswered the question concerning the constitutionality of
single-member districts, which raises the possibility that future
cases may address this glaring hole in judicial jurisprudence
concerning electoral issues. Reliance on the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, however, limits our ability to fully understand the
relationship between single-member districts and Article I,
Section 4 because the broader historical meaning, development,
and political application of the Election Clause emerged within
Congress, not the courts.
CONCLUSION
Members of the House of Representatives are elected using
single-member districts and the plurality rule, and these electoral
rules have become deeply entrenched in American politics. This
institutional feature, however, is not mandated by the
Constitution. The decision to utilize this electoral arrangement
was ultimately decided by Congress. The congressional process of
accepting this configuration had substantive effects on the
concepts of federalism and representation. Members of Congress
constructed constitutional meaning related to the Times, Places,
and Manner Clause in the process of legitimizing the singlemember district requirement during debates over the 1842

72 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); and Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
73. Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1995).
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Apportionment Act. During this process, the Clause was
understood broadly, allowing Congress to require states adopt a
particular method of electing representations and settling the
meaning of Article I, Section 4. Subsequent political
developments firmly lodged this power over elections with
Congress at the expense of a decentralized process that allowed
states to determine the method of electing representatives.
The Supreme Court has decided, and continues to decide,
important cases involving single-member districts and the process
of drawing congressional districts. Yet, the Court has never
established the constitutionality of a particular electoral voting
system. This leaves the use of single-member districts as the
accepted form of electing representatives deeply entrenched with
Congress and the political process by which the meaning of the
Elections Clause was constructed. This article attempts to fill an
important void in constitutional development left by the Court’s
lack of jurisprudence by focusing on the origin and
constitutionality of single-member districts in American political
development. As the Court currently reassesses the
constitutionality of processes for drawing district lines, it may be
time to also reassess the use of single-member districts in general
and Congress’ power to require a specific electoral method for
selecting representatives, especially if the representation
provided by a system of single-member districts is deemed
unsatisfactory and insufficient. The continued use of the singlemember districts system is ultimately a political choice, a choice
that can be reconsidered by the states, Congress, or through
constitutional amendment.

